The presence of stochastic and deterministic trends in DSGE models may imply that the values of the agents'objective functions are in…nite. For the households', this might happen if the consumption process has a su¢ ciently high growth rate and the subjective discount factor is very close to 1. The problem associated with objective functions attaining in…nite values is that they do not have an optimum. Hence, DSGE models with trends may have invalid micro foundations because the optimal behavior of the agents is indetermined. In a rich DSGE model we derive su¢ cient conditions which ensure that the households' and the …rms' objective functions do not attain in…nite values. Based on these results we test the validity of the micro foundation in four calibrated or estimated DSGE models from the literature.
Introduction
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models are often speci…ed with stochastic and deterministic trends. These features are added to the models in order to explain the non-stationary and trending behavior in the time series for GDP, Consumption, Investments etc. Recent examples are the DSGE models in Ireland (2004b) , Ireland (2004a) , Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum & Linde (2005) , Negro, Schorfheide, Smets & Wouters (2005) , , An (2005) , Justiniano & Primiceri (2005) , Fernández-Villaverde & RubioRamírez (2006) , Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) and Gorodnichenko & Ng (2007) . But, including trends in DSGE models is a non-standard extension of the basic framework because these trends may imply that the households'or the …rms'objective functions attain in…nite values. For the households' optimization problem, this might happen if the consumption process has a su¢ -ciently high growth rate and the subjective discount factor ( ) is very close 1. The problem associated with objective functions attaining in…nite values is that they cannot be optimized and hence we cannot determine the optimal action of the economic agents. In other words, DSGE models with trends may face the serious problem of not having a valid micro foundation because the optimal behaviour is indetermined. Although the problem seems obvious the issue has not been addressed in any of the papers listed above. Even in the two pioneer papers by King, Plosser & Rebelo (1988a) and King, Plosser & Rebelo (1988b) is the problem only address in the case of a deterministic trend in the model but not with a stochastic trend. The present paper addresses the problem and closes an important gab in the literature by deriving su¢ cient conditions which ensure a valid micro foundation for DSGE models with deterministic and stochastic trends.
We derive these su¢ cient conditions in a rich DSGE model which, up to two minor exceptions, nests the models considered in King et al. (1988b) , Ireland (2004a) , Altig et al. (2005) and Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) . However, both exceptions are without loss of generality for the purpose of this paper. We return to this point in the next section. In addition, our DSGE model has two new interesting features. First, we include a non-stationary shock in the households' utility function as a way to specify long lasting changes in the households'intertemporal preferences. Second, our model also introduces a new way of specifying public spendings in DSGE models with trends. We …nd this speci…cation of public spendings easier to motivate and hence more realistic than the speci…cation in Schmitt- Grohé & Uribe (2006) . The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our DSGE model. Section 3 describes the su¢ cient conditions which ensure that the households'and the …rms'objective functions do not attain in…nite values. Based on these conditions we examine the validity of the micro foundation for the DSGE models in King et al. (1988b) , Ireland (2004a) , Altig et al. (2005) and Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) . Section 4 concludes.
The DSGE model
This section describes our DSGE model where we use the same framework as in Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) . The following two reasons motivate our choice. First, Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) show how to derive the exact nonlinear recursive representation of the equilibrium conditions for DSGE models of this type. Thus, when we in section 3 derive su¢ cient conditions which ensure the validity of the micro foundation then these conditions will be independent of the approximation method used to solve the DSGE model. Second, Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) use a ‡exible speci…cation of the labor markets which does not restriction preferences to be separable in consumption and leisure. However, such a restriction is required in the speci…cation of the labor markets used in Altig et al. (2005) .
The foundation of our DSGE model is the standard neoclassical growth model with four groups of agents: i) households, ii) …rms, iii) a government and iv) a central bank. The economy is driven by mutually independent structural shocks which we specify below. To this basic structure we add a number of extensions which may be grouped as follows: First, nominal frictions are introduced through: i) sticky wages, ii) sticky prices, iii) a transactional demand for money by households and iv) a cash-in-advance constraint on a fraction of the …rms'wage bill. Second, real frictions are added by assuming: i) adjustment costs related to new investments, ii) a variable capacity utilization rate of the capital stock, iii) habit formation and money in the households'utility function, and iv) imperfect competition in the goods and the labor markets. Finally, stochastic and deterministic trends are added to the model. Although our DSGE model is very rich it does not perfectly nest the models by King et al. (1988b) , Ireland (2004a) , Altig et al. (2005) and Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) for the following two reasons. First, we do not include the same stationary shocks as in these models because the conditions we derive for the validity of the micro foundation are una¤ected by these shocks. Second, our speci…cation of the labor markets di¤ers from the speci…cation in Altig et al. (2005) . The reason being, that they assume that each household supplies labor to only one labor market whereas we assume the existence of a representative family which supplies labor to all labor markets. Again, this di¤erence is without loss of generality for the conditions ensuring the validity of the micro foundation.
The households
For sake of clarity the presentation of the households'optimization problem is split into three subsections which describe the households' i) preferences, ii) constraints and iii) …rst-orderconditions. 1
The households'preferences
We start by assuming that the behavior of the households may be described by a representative family with a continuum of members. Each member of this family has the same amount of consumption, hours of work and money holdings. The family's preferences are speci…ed by a utility function de…ned over real per capita consumption (c t ), per capita labor supply (h t ) and real per capita money holdings m h
Here E t denotes the conditional expectation given information available at time t and 2 [0; 1[ is the subjective discount factor. The function u ( ; ; ) is a period utility index which we assume has the form u c t bc t 1 ; h t ; m . We also require that: i) 6 6 = 0 or 7 6 = 0, ii) c t =c t 1 > b and iii) c t > e t z t for all t and all realizations to ensure that the utility index in (2) is always well-de…ned. We do emphasize that the utility index in (2) should not be consider as an unrestricted function which could be taken to the data. Our intension is only to set up a utility index which reduces to the utility indexes use in the related papers with appropriate restrictions.
The condition c t =c t 1 > b may impose an upper bound less than 1 on the parameter b which speci…cs the level of the internal habit e¤ect in the consumption good. The name of this habit e¤ect is due to the fact that the present habit level is determined by the family's own consumption in the previous period (bc t 1 ). On the other hand, the variable e t denotes an external habit e¤ect and di¤ers from the …rst habit e¤ect by being exogenous to the representative family. Notice, that the external habit is scaled by z t which is an overall measure of technological progress in the economy. Adopting this scaling of e t ensures that the external habit e¤ect does not diminish along the balanced-growth path. We leave the form of the external habit e¤ect unspeci…ed and only require that e t is a function of stationary variables. 2 Finally, the labor supply in (2) is normalized such that h t 2 [0; 1[.
In the table below we show how our utility function nests the various speci…cations in the four related papers. The novel feature of our utility function in (1) is the non-stationary exogenous shock, denoted " h;t , which introduces long lasting preference shocks into the economy. The process for " h;t is speci…ed based on the gross growth rate " h ;t+1 " h;t+1 =" h;t where we assume are assumed to be independent and identical distributed according to a general probability distribution. We denote this by " h t+1 s iid. Notice, that " h ;ss = 1 in the steady state. Although, the idea of specifying shocks to the households'intertemporal preferences is widely used in literature the speci…cation in (1) and (3) is new. This follows from the fact that the process for ln " h;t is typically assumed to be stationary in the literature whereas we assume that the process for ln " h;t is integrated of order one and thus non-stationary. This implies that " h;t has a stochastic trend of the form exp P t i=1 a i where a i is a stationary variable. In section 2.6 and section 3 of this paper we show that the speci…cation in (1) and (3) is a feasible extension of the framework developed by Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) .
Following the standard assumption in the literature the consumption good is constructed from a continuum of di¤erentiated goods (c i;t ; i 2 [0; 1]) and the aggregation function
Here > 1 is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution across the di¤erentiated goods. The demand for c i;t with nominal price P i;t is found by solving the following problem for each level of c t
M in
This implies that the demand for good i is given by
where
is the nominal price index in the economy. Hence, the in ‡ation rate is given by t P t =P t 1 .
The constraints on the households
The …rst constraint on the households originates from basic assumptions in the labor markets. In the framework developed by Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) labor decisions in the household are assumed to be made by a central authority within the household, which we think of as a union. This union supplies labor monopolistically to a continuum of labor markets, indexed by j 2 [0; 1], and faces a labor demand given by (W j;t =W t ) ~ h d t in each market. A derivation of this equation is postponed to the presentation of the …rms'optimization problem. At this point it is su¢ cient to know that: i) W j;t is the nominal wage charged by the union in the j'th labor market, ii) W t is a nominal wage index and iii) h d t is a measure of the total labor demand in the economy. Both W t and h d t are considered exogenous by the union. Furthermore, we assume that the union determines the wages in each labor market and supplies enough labor to meet labor demand in all markets. This implies that the total labor supply to market j at time t is given by
where w j;t W j;t =P t and w t W t =P t . Hence, the total labor supply (h t ) across all markets must satisfy the resource constraint
The second constraint is also related to the labor markets and describes how the union can change wages. We follow Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) and assume that in each period the union cannot set the nominal wages optimally in a fraction~ 2 [0; 1[ of randomly chosen labor markets. In these labor markets the wages are set according to the rule W j;t = W j;t 1 h z ;t 1 h t 1 ~ . The parameter~ 2 [0; 1] measures the degree of indexation to h z ;t 1 h t 1 . Here, h z ;t 1 denotes the households' gross growth rate target in real wages and h t 1 denotes the households'target for the gross in ‡ation rate. Hence, for~ = 0 there is no wage stickiness which is the case consider by King et al. (1988b) and Ireland (2004a) . If we on the other hand let h t 1 = t 1 and h z ;t = z ;ss then we get the same speci…cation as in Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) and if we further let~ = 1 then we get the speci…cation in Altig et al. (2005) .
The third constraint is the law of motion for the physical capital stock (k t ) which is assumed to be owned by the households. We adopt the standard assumption in the literature by letting
The parameter 2 [0; 1] is the depreciation rate for the capital stock and i t is gross investments. The function S ( ) = 2 ( it i t 1 i;ss ) 2 with 0 adds investment adjustment costs to the economy based on changes in the growth rate of investments. The value for the growth rate in investments in steady state i;ss is determined such that there are no adjustments costs along the balanced-growth path.
The fourth constraint is the households'real period by period budget constraint
The function l ( ) determines the transactional costs imposed on the households based on the velocity v t c t =m h t . Equation (10) also introduces capital adjustment costs through the function a (u t ) where u t is the capacity utilization rate of the capital stock. We assume standard functional forms for both functions, i.e.
where 1 and 2 are subject to the constraint that l ( ) 0 and u t is normalized to 1 in the steady state. Furthermore, we require that 1 0 and 2 0. The left hand side of (10) is the households'total expenditures in period t which are used to: i) purchase state-contingent claims E t r t;t+1 x h t+1 , ii) consumption including transaction costs (c t [1 + l (v t )]), iii) investments and costs of providing capital services to the …rms
, iv) the real money holdings m h t and paying transfers (n t ) to the government. Notice, that 1 t is the real price in terms of consumption goods for investing and selling capital services to the …rms. Changes in t are often referred to as embodied technology changes because this type of technological progress is embodied in the economy's capital stock. The right hand side of (10) is the households' total wealth in period t which consists of: i) pay-o¤ from state-contingent assets purchased in period t 1 x h t = t , ii) the real money holdings from the previous period m h t 1 = t , iii) income from selling capital services to the …rms r k t u t k t , iv) labor income R 1 0 w j;t h j;t dj and v) dividends received from the …rms ( t ). Since all these assumptions and frictions are standard in the literature (see Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (2005) , Altig et al. (2005) and Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2004)) we keep the presentation short and only introduce notation.
The …nal constraints are a no-Ponzi-game condition and a no-arbitrage restriction on the gross one-period nominal interest rate, R t;1 1:
The …rst-order-conditions for the households
The households'objective is to maximize the utility function in (1) with respect to the processes for c t , x h t+1 , h t , k t+1 , i t , u t , m h t and w j;t given the constraints listed in the previous subsection. In doing so, the households take the processes for w t , r k t , h d t , r t;t+1 , t , h t , t , t , h z ;t and n t as given. This is also the case for the initial conditions for c 0 , x h 0 , k 0 , i 1 , m h 1 , and w j;0 . We let the lagrange multipliers for constraints (8), (9) and (10) 
for all states (14)
3 The variable to the left of each equation denotes the variable for which the equation is a …rst-order-condition.
In (21) we use the notation
and M RS h;c t " h;t u h( ct bc t 1 ;ht;m h t ) t to simplify the expression. Equation (13) shows that changes in the households'time preferences through " h;t a¤ect the value of t which may be interpreted as the expected marginal utility of income. The standard expression for the nominal stochastic discount factor appears in (14) and pricing a one-period zero-coupon bond gives the familiar Euler-equation
For an interpretation of the other …rst-order-conditions we refer to Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) and Christiano, Eichenbaum & Evans (2001) . Following the procedure described in Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006), the exact recursive representation of (21) is given by f 1 t f 2 t = 0 where
The …rms
The production in the economy is assumed to be undertaken by a continuum of …rms, indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. Here, we adopt the standard assumptions saying that each …rm supplies a di¤erentiable good y s i;t to the goods market which is characterized by monopolistic competition with no exit or entry. Furthermore, all …rms have access to the same technology given as follows
with 2 ]0; 1[ and 0. Here, k i;t and h i;t denote physical capital and labor services used by the i'th …rm. As in the case of the di¤erentiated consumption goods, …rm i's demand in the j'th labor market h 
Here W j;t is the nominal wage paid to labor services in labor market j. The solution to the problem is
is the nominal wage index. Aggregating equation (27) (28) and (29) imply that the processes for ln z t and ln t have a stochastic trend and the deterministic trends are ln z and ln , respectively. These results follows directly from the MA-representations for the processes in (28) and (29). In the case of neutral technology shocks we have that ln z;t z;ss = a t where a t is a stationary variable. Hence, ln z t = ln z t 1 + ln z;ss + a t .
All …rms are assumed to maximize the present value of their nominal dividend payments, denoted d i;t . That is, each …rm maximizes
where the expression for the real dividend payments from the i'th …rm i;t are given below in (32). When doing so, the …rms face …ve constraints. The …rst is related to the good produced by the i'th …rm. The total amount of good i is allocated to: i) consumption including transaction costs, ii) public spendings ( g i;t ), iii) investments and iv) costs of providing capital services to the …rms. We make the standard assumption that the aggregation function for the three latter components coincides with the aggregation function for consumption in (4). Hence, the restriction on the aggregate demand can be written as
In addition, we assume that the …rms satisfy demand, i.e. y s i;t y d i;t 8i 2 [0; 1]. The second restriction is a cash-in-advance constraint on a fraction of the …rms'payments to workers. Thus, the money demanded by the i'th …rm is m f i;t = w t h i;t . This assumption is also standard in the literature and serves the purpose of motivating demand for money at the …rm level.
The third constraint is the budget restriction which gives rise to the expression for real dividends from …rm i in period t i;t = (P i;t =P t ) y The …rst term in (32) denotes the real revenue from sales of the i'th good. The …rm's expenditures are allocated to: i) purchase of capital services r k t k i;t , ii) payments to the workers (w t h i;t ) and iii) opportunity costs of holding money due to the cash-in-advance constraint
. The …nal terms in (32) constitute the change in the …rm's real …nancial wealth.
The fourth constraint introduces staggered price adjustments. We make the standard assumption that in each period a fraction 2 [0; 1[ of randomly picked …rms are not allowed to set the optimal nominal price of the good they produce. Instead, these …rms update their prices according to the rule P i;t = P i;t 1
where 2 [0; 1] and f t 1 is the …rms'in ‡ation rate target. Hence, for = 0 there is no price stickiness which is the case consider by King et al. (1988b) and Ireland (2004a) . If we let f t 1 = t 1 then we get the speci…cation used in Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) and if we further let = 1 then we get the setup in Altig et al. (2005) .
The …fth constraint is a no-Ponze-game condition.
Given these constraints …rm i maximizes the present discounted value of dividend payments with respect to x f i;t , m f i;t , h i;t , k i;t and P i;t given the processes for R t;1 , P t , w t , r k t , z t , z t , y d t , h t , t and the nominal stochastic discount factor between period t and period t + l, denoted r t;t+l . As in Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) we assume, without loss of generality, that x f i;t + m f i;t = 0 in all periods and states. De…ning r t;t+l P t+l mc i;t+l as the lagrange multiplier for the constraint y s i;t y d i;t , the …rst-order-conditions are h i;t : mc i;t z t F 2 (k i;t ; z t h i;t ) = w t 1 + 1 1 R t;1 (33)
P i;t : P i;t = P t if …rm i is optimizing P i;t 1 h t 1 else (35)
. Following the procedure described in Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) we derive the exact recursive representation of (36) as x 1 t + (1 ) x 2 t = 0 where
The government
This section describes the role of the government in the economy. The …scal policy is speci…ed as the following process for the aggregated public spendings
where g 2 [0; 1] and g t is some unspeci…ed exogenous stationary process. Equation (39) clearly nests the speci…cation of public spendings in King et al. (1988b) , Ireland (2004a) , Altig et al. (2005) and Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006). We prefer the speci…cation where g = 1, implying that g t = w t g t , because public spendings are mostly used to provide labor intensive services such as law and order, education, administration etc. Thus, public spendings are approximately proportional to wages. Changes in the public spendings unrelated to the wage level are picked up by the exogenous process for g t . This could be expenditures related to large …scal reforms, wars etc. Notice, that equation (39) implies that the ratio between public spendings and total demand is constant along the balanced growth path. Part of the public spendings is …nanced by seigniorage. If we let m t m h t + R 1 0 m f i;t di be the total amount of outstanding real money then seigniorage is given by m t m t 1 = t . To keep things simple, we assume that there exists lump-sum transfers (n t ) which are set to ensure that the government's intertemporal budget constraint always holds. Thus, given the process for g t this policy regime is Ricardian.
The central bank
The monetary policy is conducted by the central bank and generally its behavior may either be speci…ed by a rule for the interest rate or by a rule for the money stock. It turns out that the speci…c nature of these policy rules is unimportant for the validity of the micro foundation, provided that these rules are based on stationary variables. Therefore, we choose not to specify monetary policy explicitly but simply require that the policy rule should be based on stationary variables.
Aggregation
An explicit aggregation is necessary in the goods and labor markets. This is due to the di¤er-entiated consumption goods and the large number of labor markets. The aggregation in our DSGE model is identical to the aggregation described by Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006). Below we brie ‡y summarize the aggregated relations for sake of completeness.
We start by considering the aggregate goods market where the resource constraint reads
These equations are derived by summing over all goods while taking into account that i) …rms have access to the same technology which is homogenous of degree one and ii) the ratio k i;t =h i;t is constant across all …rms. The state variable s t is equal to or greater than one and in case of fully ‡exible prices ( = 0) we have s t = 1. So, s t measures the resource costs due to the presence of sticky prices.
The aggregated relations for the …rms'…rst-order-conditions for labor and capital and total dividend payments, t R 1 0 i;t di, are
The resource constraint in the aggregate labor market resembles the constraint in the goods market and is given by
Recall that h t is the total labor supply and h d t is the total labor demand. The state variables t is equal to or greater than one and in case of fully ‡exible wages (~ = 0) we haves t = 1. Equation (45) therefore implies an unemployment level of h d t (1 s t ) 0 which is a cost of having sticky wages.
Aggregating the real money holdings gives
Finally, we derive the relationship between the real optimal pricep t P t
Pt and the in ‡ation rate ( t ) and the relationship between the real wage index (w t ) and the optimal real wage (w t )
Solving the DSGE model
The three non-stationary processes for the shocks in our DSGE model imply that some of the variables in the model are non-stationary. An easy way to get around this problem when solving the model is to transform the economy such that we only have equilibrium conditions with stationary variables. The solution to the transformed economy is then easy to approximate by standard solution methods for DSGE models. We get the desired solution of our DSGE model by transforming the solution back into the original setting. Thus, we only need to show how to construct the transformed economy. We proceed as follows: First, observe that c t , w t , w t , y d i;t , y d t , i;t , t , x 2 t , g t , n t , m h t and m t all are cointegrated with 1=z t in such a way that c t =z t ; w t =z t and so on are stationary. Likewise, r k t and q t cointegrate with t and i t ; k t+1 and k i;t+1 cointegrate with 1=( t z t ). Finally, t and f 2 t cointegrate with 1=(z (1 3 )(1 4 ) 1 t " h;t ) and 1=(z (1 3 )(1 4 ) t " h;t ), respectively. All the remaining variables in the model are stationary -in particular, the labor supply, the interest rate and the in ‡ation rate. If " h;t = 1 for all t we obtain the same cointegrating results as in Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) . Next, we construct the transformed variables by multiplying the variables with their corresponding cointegrating factor. These transformed variables are denoted by the corresponding capital letters. I.e. C t c t =z t , R k t r k t t and so on. The equilibrium conditions are then rewritten in terms of the transformed variables in order to get the transformed economy. 4 It is interesting to note that a long lasting preference shock (" h;t ) does not a¤ect variables like real consumption and real production in the long run. Only the households'expected marginal value of income ( t ) and the control variable f 2 t related to the labor markets are a¤ected by a long lasting preference shock in the long run.
Su¢ cient conditions for a valid micro foundation
This section derives su¢ cient conditions which ensure the validity of the micro foundation in our DSGE model. We introduce the following notation to ease the presentation below
We …rst consider the conditions which ensure that the households'utility functions have a …nite value in the case of power preferences for the habit adjusted consumption good. C t b
Proof. See the technical appendix.
Conditions 1.a) and 1.b) in proposition 1 are not directly testable for our DSGE model because C t , h t and M h t are unknown functions of the state variables in the economy. Recall, that C t and M h t are the households'consumption and money holding, respectively, expressed in deviation from the stochastic and deterministic growth path in the economy. The variable h t is the households'labor supply. Nevertheless, we show in the next section that the two conditions are satis…ed if we impose an additional assumption on our DSGE model.
All the remaining conditions in proposition 1 are easy to check directly given distributional assumptions for the error terms. In particular because M X (t) E [exp fXtg], where X is a stochastic variable, is known as the moment generating function and reported in relation to probability distributions having a moment generating function. Notice, that if moment generating function exists and the probability distribution is symmetric then conditions 2.a) to 2.c) are automatically satis…ed.
In the table below we report some of the most frequently used error distributions and their properties. 5 A survey of more ‡exible error distributions is given in Hansen, McDonald & Theodossiou (2007) . Notice however, that the Student t-distribution and the Cauchy distribution do not have a moment generating function. Hence, conditions 2-4 in proposition 1 are never satis…ed if these distributions are used for the innovations to long lasting shocks in our DSGE model. 
The third condition in proposition 1 states that E exp shocks imposes a stronger restriction on the value of . The intuition behind this result is that the households' subjective discounting factor ( ) now must o¤ set two e¤ects in order to get a …nite value for the utility function: i) the in…nite utility stream and ii) the stochastic trend generated by " h;t .
We interprete the fourth condition in proposition 1 by …rst considering the case with only deterministic trends in the processes for technology. In this case the condition reduces to F ;ss Fz z;ss < 1. In general, ;ss > 1 and z;ss > 1 but the sign of F and F z depends on the value of 3 . If 3 > 1, which is probably the most realistic case, then F ; F z < 0 and the deterministic trends operate as additional discounting factors in the households'utility function. If 3 < 1 then F ; F z > 0 and the opposite situation is the case. Notice, that if our DSGE models does not have deterministic growth in embodied technology ( ;ss = 1) then the condition is Fz z;ss < 1 which is exactly the same condition as in King et al. (1988a) where Fz z;ss is called the e¤ective time rate of preference. 6 On the other hand, if we only have stochastic trends and no deterministic trends in our DSGE model i.e.
;ss = z;ss = 1 then condition 4 is
which is an even more restrictive condition on than condition 3. Hence, adding deterministic trends to a model with stochastic trends may be recommend based on proposition 1 because the deterministic trends are most likely to operate as additional discounting factors.
The next proposition considers the limiting case where 3 ! 1 implying log preference for the habit adjusted consumption good and separability between this good and the labor supply.
Proposition 2 Let 3 ! 1. The following conditions are su¢ cient for a …nite value for the representative family's utility function, that is for U t 2 R 1. a) ln C t b
Conditions 1.a) to 1.c) in proposition 2 are not directly testable for our DSGE model because C t , h t and M h t are unknown functions of the state variables in the economy. We return to these conditions in the next section. The remaining conditions 2-3 in proposition 2 are clearly less restrictive than conditions 2-4 in proposition 1. These weaker restrictions arises because the log preferences for the consumption good transforms the stochastic trends in technology from exp f P 1 i=t a i g to P 1 i=t a i where fa i g 1 i=1 is a stationary process with zero mean. Hence, in the case of log preferences the requirements on are less restrictive than with power preferences because does not have to o¤ set the e¤ect of the stochastic trends in technology. We also note, that without long lasting preference shocks in our DSGE model it is only required that E t t+1 < 1 and E t z t+1 < 1 besides conditions 1.a) to 1.d) in proposition 2. Again, if the error distributions are symmetric and has a mean value then the conditions E t t+1 < 1 and E t z t+1 < 1 are clearly statis…ed.
Finally, the conditions for the i'th …rm's optimization problem to be well-de…ned.
Proposition 3
The following conditions are su¢ cient for a …nite value for the present value of the i'te …rm's nominal dividend payments, that is for d i;t 2 R 1. a) j t j < 1 and b) j i;t j < 1 8t; 8i 0 and 8 realizations where
;ss Fz z;ss < 1
Evaluating the boundness conditions
This section examines the boundness conditions in the three propositions from above in greater detail. For this purpose we impose the assumption:
Assumption 1 All variables in the economy, execpt exogenous state variables, must be within a …nite distance from the economy's stochastic and deterministic growth path.
Assumption 1 means that all variables in the transformed economy, execpt exogenous state variables, are bounded from above and from below. We exclude exogenous state variables in Assumption 1 because assuming that these state variables should be bounded would contradict with the speci…ed law of motions for the variables. Notice, that Assumption 1 does not rule out an in…nite consumption level, for instance, since the actual consumption level (c t ) is given by the relation c t = C t z t and the aggregated measure of technology z t may tend to in…nity for t ! 1. It is important to realize that our Assumption 1 of not being too fare away from the stochastic and deterministic growth path is the same assumption which implicitly is used when solving DSGE models by local procedures like the log-linearization approach. Hence, Assumption 1 is actually a standard assumption in the literature.
We proceed with the following three Lemmas.
Lemma 3 Assumption 1 implies that for all t and all realizations:
Lemma 4 (Only external habit e¤ect) Assumption 1 and 5 = 1 implies that jln (C t e t )j < 1 for all t and all realizations
Lemma 5 (No internal or external habit e¤ect) Assumption 1, 5 = 0 and b = 0 implies that ln C t b C t 1 z ;t < 1 for all t and all realizations Second, the model by Altig et al. (2005) also use log preferences for the consumption good and an internal habit e¤ect. As mentioned above this combination may be a problem for the boundness conditions in proposition 2 if the internal habit e¤ect is very strong. The highest estimate of b in Altig et al. (2005) is 0:73. The paper uses quarterly data and it therefore seems reasonable to assume that the boundness conditions in proposition 2 holds. Moreover, the model by Altig et al. (2005) has long lasting neutral and embodied technology shocks so also E t t+1 < 1 and E t z t+1 < 1 are required according to proposition 2. The probability distributions for the shocks are not speci…ed but the conditions clearly hold if we in addition assume symmetric error distributions.
Finally, the DSGE model by Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) is calibrated to the case of log preferences even though the model is set up also to encompass power preferences. Furthermore, the model by Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe (2006) has an internal habit e¤ect of a moderate degree (b = 0:69) and long lasting neutral and embodied technology shocks. Hence, the requirements are E t t+1 < 1 and E t z t+1 < 1 in addition to the boundness conditions. SchmittGrohé & Uribe (2006) do not specify probability distributions for the two shocks but again the conditions hold if the error distributions are assumed to be symmetric.
Summing up, we …nd that all the four DSGE models have a valid micro foundation provided we add an assumption of symmetric error distributions in the cases where the functional form for the distributions are not speci…ed.
Conclusion
This paper closes an important gab in the literature by deriving su¢ cient conditions which ensure the validity of the micro foundation for DSGE models with stochastic and deterministic trends. In addition, we show how to introduce long lasting preference shocks in the households' utility function. This feature is new compared to the existing DSGE models since these models only specify long lasting shocks to the economy's production technology. Finally, this paper suggests a new way of specifying public spendings by making these spendings proportional to the real wage.
An important implication of this paper is that every DSGE model with stochastic and/or deterministic trends should be speci…ed such that they ful…ll the conditions in proposition 1 to proposition 3. In the case of log preferences for the consumption good the conditions are relatively weak, in particular if the long lasting preference shocks are left out. In this case, assuming symmetric error distributions is su¢ cient as shown in the previous section. On the other hand, in the case of power preferences for the consumption good the conditions are more restrictive and greater care most be taken when setting up the DSGE model. For instance, a DSGE model with power preferences for the consumption good should never be speci…ed with a stochastic trend where the innovation in this trend follows a Student-t distribution. But, for stationary shocks Student -t distributed shocks may still be used without any problems.
On an empirical level, future research could be devoted to estimate or calibrate DSGE models with power preferences since DSGE models with trends have mostly been estimated or calibrated based on log preferences for the consumption good. Furthermore, it would also be of great interest to examine whether the restrictions on in the three propositions are binding, in particular when long lasting shocks to the households'utility function are added to the model. On a theoretical level, future research could derive su¢ cient conditions ensuring the validity of the micro foundation in DSGE models where the growth rates for the long lasting shocks evolve according to ARMA(p,q) processes and/or have stochastic volatility.
